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Abstract
To what extent do car buyers undervalue future fuel costs, and what does this imply
for the e¤ectiveness of alternative tax policies? To address both questions, we show
it is crucial to account for consumer heterogeneity in mileage and other dimensions.
We use detailed product-level data for a long panel of European countries, and exploit
variation in fuel prices by engine type. We nd there is only modest undervaluation of
fuel costs. As a consequence, fuel taxes are unambiguously more e¤ective in reducing
fuel usage than product taxes based on fuel economy, because fuel taxes better target
high mileage consumers.
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1 Introduction
Governments are using a variety of policies to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars.
A central question in this debate is whether it is preferable to focus on fuel taxes or on
policies that encourage the sales of fuel e¢ cient cars, such as standards or product taxes
based on the carsfuel economy. Fuel taxes are often favored because they directly inuence
the car usage decision and hence the amount of CO2 emissions. Furthermore, they may also
indirectly inuence the car purchase decision if consumers take into account their expected
future fuel costs. However, if driving behavior is rather inelastic and if consumers are myopic
and ignore future fuel cost savings when purchasing a car, then it may be more e¤ective to
directly inuence the car purchase decision through standards or through up-front product
taxes on cars with low fuel economy (possibly combined with product subsidies on cars
with high fuel economy). In sum, fuel taxes may be more e¤ective because they reduce car
usage when driving behavior is not perfectly inelastic, while product taxes may be more
e¤ective because they can stimulate consumers to buy more fuel e¢ cient cars if there is an
investment ine¢ ciency because of consumer myopia (see Allcott and Greenstone (2012) for
a recent detailed review).
In this paper we contribute to this debate in two steps. We rst ask whether consumers
undervalue or correctly value the discounted future fuel costs when purchasing a new car. We
subsequently ask what this implies for the relative e¤ectiveness of fuel taxes versus product
taxes based on the cars fuel economy. We dene the e¤ectiveness of both taxes in terms
of their reduction in total fuel usage (where the taxes are revenue equivalent).1 Our main
contribution is to empirically demonstrate the crucial importance of accounting for di¤erent
sources of consumer heterogeneity, in particular mileage heterogeneity. This not only avoids
biased parameter estimates of consumersvaluation of future fuel costs. It also accounts for
another potentially important advantage of fuel taxes over product taxes: fuel taxes may
not only reduce usage, but they also target the right consumers (with a high mileage) to
purchase the most fuel e¢ cient cars. This aspect of fuel taxes has not been empirically
analyzed before.
To address these questions, we build on the aggregate random coe¢ cients logit demand
model of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), and introduce a specication that accounts for
heterogeneous responses to fuel costs because consumers may di¤er in their annual mileage.
We conservatively assume that driving behavior (mileage) is perfectly inelastic with respect
1Our focus on e¤ectiveness has the advantage of simplicity, and is of direct interest to policy makers
interested in reducing fuel consumption (and driving) in a revenue-neutral way. With additional information
about the external costs of fuel consumption and driving, and about the nature of competition in the market,
one could also use our estimates to conduct a more complete welfare analysis for the e¤ects of both taxes.
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to the fuel price. We show that the relative e¤ectiveness of fuel taxes versus fuel economy-
based product taxes depends on two key parameters: consumersvaluation of future fuel
costs and mileage heterogeneity.
To estimate the demand model, we use detailed data at the level of the car model and
engine variant for a panel of seven European countries during 1998-2011. The institutional
features of the European car market provides a new way to identify consumer responses to
fuel costs, because for most car models consumers can choose between two engine types:
gasoline and diesel. Diesel cars are typically more expensive (by on average about 30%), but
they also involve much lower fuel costs because of a higher fuel economy (by about 20%)
and a lower diesel fuel price (by about 20 cents per liter, depending on the specic countrys
fuel tax policy). The consumersintertemporal choice problem is correspondingly simpler
in Europe than in the U.S., since consumers can trade o¤ the higher initial purchase price
of a diesel engine against the future fuel cost savings of an otherwise nearly identical car.
To empirically identify consumer responses to fuel costs, we exploit fuel price variation by
fuel type (i.e. gasoline or diesel) across countries and over time, interacted with variation
in fuel economy across products. This complements other identication approaches, mainly
for the U.S. market, where diesel cars are practically absent: these studies typically can rely
on rich time-series variation in the price of gasoline, interacted with fuel economy variation
across products (e.g. Klier and Linn (2010), Li, Timmins and von Haefen (2009), Allcott
and Wozny (2012), Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2013), Langer and Miller (2013)).2
Regarding the valuation of future fuel costs, we nd evidence of at most only modest
undervaluation: for one euro saving in discounted future fuel costs, consumers are willing to
pay e0.87 in the form of a higher initial purchase price. The 95% condence interval of this
willingness to pay is between e0.71 and e1.04, so that modest undervaluation or correct
valuation cannot be rejected. To obtain this estimate, it is not only important to account for
mileage heterogeneity to avoid a sorting bias towards undervaluation (Bento, Li and Roth,
2012). We demonstrate that it is also necessary to account for heterogeneity in the valuation
of other car characteristics, since otherwise we would estimate signicant overvaluation of
discounted fuel costs (the willingness to pay would be equal to e1.27, with a condence
interval between e1.12 and e1.42).
Regarding the e¤ectiveness of fuel taxes versus product taxes (based on a cars fuel
economy), we again nd that it is crucial to account for mileage heterogeneity. Without
accounting for this, a fuel tax is less e¤ective in reducing total fuel usage than a revenue-
equivalent product tax on fuel economy, because of the modest undervaluation of future fuel
2The time-series variation in gasoline prices tends to be larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and the car
sales and price information is often observed at a higher frequency (monthly instead of annually).
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costs. Accounting for mileage heterogeneity reverses this result. In this case, a fuel tax turns
out to be more e¤ective in reducing total fuel usage because it specically targets the high
mileage consumers to substitute to cars with a higher fuel economy. In sum, we establish
that a fuel tax is more e¤ective than a product tax in shifting demand to more fuel e¢ cient
cars, since the undervaluation e¤ect is dominated by the mileage heterogeneity e¤ect. This
conclusion is obtained under the assumption that driving behavior is perfectly inelastic. If
we would allow driving behavior to depend on fuel prices, our results would be strengthened,
since in this case a fuel tax would also induce consumers to reduce their car usage, conditional
on the car purchase.
To further explore the e¤ectiveness of fuel taxes under mileage heterogeneity, we also
consider the impact of separately raising the price of diesel fuel or gasoline fuel (rather than
simultaneously raising both). This is of broader interest, since countries are increasingly
using fuel-specic tax policies to encourage the adoption of cars with alternative fuels (such
as methanol). We nd that the role of mileage heterogeneity becomes even more important
under such fuel-specic tax policies. For example, only raising the price of gasoline fuel
implies a large shift to diesel cars with higher fuel economy, and this shift is especially by
high mileage consumers. As a result, this policy is especially e¤ective in reducing total fuel
usage and hence CO2 emissions (although this can come at the expense of creating other
environmental costs from diesel cars).3 As a nal examination of the implications of our
model, we consider the e¤ects of harmonizing diesel fuel prices and diesel fuel economy to
the level of gasoline. We nd that both factors explain more than half of the diesel market
share in Europe, though less so in the most recent years.
Our paper relates to several strands in the literature. First, our nding of at most only
modest undervaluation of future fuel costs contributes to a long empirical debate since Haus-
man (1979). He estimated consumersimplicit interest rates in their intertemporal trade-o¤
between paying a higher initial purchase price for air conditioners in exchange for future
energy cost savings. Most work on the automobile market appears to nd mixed evidence
for the degree of undervaluation of future fuel costs; see Greene (2010) and Helfand and
Wolverton (2011) for recent reviews. Allcott and Wozny (2012) nd evidence of moder-
ate undervaluation, while Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2013) nd more or less correct
valuation of future fuel costs relative to the initial purchase price of a car. Bento, Li and
Roth (2012) show, both analytically and through simulations, that a failure to account for
3Miravete, Moral and Thurk (2014) stress these other (non-CO2 related) environmental costs of diesel cars,
such as raising local air pollution. They study how the lax European tax policy against these other pollution
e¤ects of diesel cars may have protected the domestic European producers against foreign competition.
They do not explicitly model mileage heterogeneity, as it is less relevant for their purposes, and focus on the
Spanish market.
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consumer heterogeneity in willingness to pay for fuel costs is responsible for a sorting bias
towards nding undervaluation, but they do not provide an empirical analysis to quantify
its importance. Our paper incorporates mileage heterogeneity to avoid this bias, and at
the same time it also incorporates other sources of consumer heterogeneity to avoid a re-
verse sorting bias. To our knowledge, no other work has systematically incorporated this to
investigate whether consumers undervalue future fuel costs.4
Second, we contribute to the literature on the relative e¤ectiveness of energy taxes ver-
sus product taxes and standards to reduce total energy usage and CO2 emissions. Allcott
and Wozny (2012) provide a detailed review on the relative e¤ectiveness of both policy in-
struments. On the one hand, energy taxes directly a¤ect usage, so they can be e¤ective in
reducing energy consumption if usage is su¢ ciently elastic. On the other hand, a product tax
on the energy-ine¢ cient product (or a subsidy on the energy-e¢ cient product in their discus-
sion) can better encourage the demand for energy-e¢ cient products if consumers undervalue
future energy cost savings, thereby reducing an investment ine¢ ciency. Our contribution to
this debate is to show that even if usage is inelastic, an energy tax can be more e¤ective than
a product tax. The reason is that if consumers are heterogeneous in their annual mileage,
an energy tax better targets the high mileage consumers than a product tax.5 In a related
theoretical paper, Allcott, Mullainathan and Taubinsky (2014) compare the combined e¤ects
of an energy tax and a product tax. They also stress the role of consumer heterogeneity,
but they focus on heterogeneity in the extent of undervaluation (or attentiveness). For
an empirical analysis, it is natural to start with mileage heterogeneity since it is directly
observed. Nevertheless, in future work it would be interesting to extend our work to allow
for heterogeneity in attentiveness.
Third, there is a large literature on estimating demand systems for automobiles. Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Petrin (2002) and others have shown how to make use of
aggregate sales data to estimate rich substitution patterns between di¤erentiated cars. While
this work has often included a random taste coe¢ cient for miles per dollar, we show how to
relate this random coe¢ cient more explicitly to consumer mileage heterogeneity. This makes
4Verboven (2002) incorporates mileage heterogeneity to explain the consumersdecision to buy a gasoline
or diesel car and obtains estimates on their implicit interest rates when trading o¤ the higher purchase
price of a diesel engine against the future fuel cost savings. However, he focuses only on the decision to
buy a gasoline or diesel engine, conditional on purchasing a certain car model. Although this avoids biases
in estimating implicit interest rates, the framework does not allow to assess how taxes shift consumers to
purchase other cars in policy counterfactuals.
5Our nding that an energy tax can be more e¤ective than a product tax does not mean that a product
tax cannot be e¤ective in itself. In an interesting recent paper, Klier and Linn (2015) use data from three
EU countries and nd that product taxes can considerably shift sales towards cars with lower emissions. Our
own results conrm this, but in addition we show that energy taxes are even more e¤ective because they
better target consumers with di¤erent mileage.
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it possible to use the aggregate demand model to address environmental questions such as
the e¤ects of tax policies on total fuel usage, whereas previous applications with aggregate
data could only assess a more limited set of e¤ects.6 There is already an important empirical
literature that uses micro-level data to thoroughly investigate the e¤ects of environmental
policies on both car purchase and car usage decisions (e.g. Goldberg (1998), Bento, Goulder,
Jacobsen and von Haefen (2009), Gillingham (2012), and DHaultfoeuille, Givord and Boutin
(2014)). However, applications with micro-data are typically limited to a single country and a
short time period. Our aggregate demandmodel with mileage heterogeneity thus considerably
broadens the scope of applications, since aggregate data can be analyzed for a large set of
countries and a longer time period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the demand model,
incorporating the consumers intertemporal trade-o¤ between the initial purchase price of
the car and future fuel costs, and highlighting the key parameters that drive consumer
responses to fuel taxes versus product taxes: a future valuation parameter and mileage
heterogeneity. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 provides details on the empirical
estimation strategy and the identication issues. Section 5 presents and discusses the demand
parameter estimates and implications for consumersvaluation of future fuel costs. Section
6 presents policy counterfactuals, in particular a comparison between fuel tax and product
taxes based on fuel-economy. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
When consumers decide to purchase a new car, they face the intertemporal trade-o¤between
the initial purchase price of the car and the expected future fuel costs. Forward-looking
consumers have a high willingness to pay for fuel e¢ cient cars that save on fuel costs,
whereas myopic consumers have a low willingness to pay for such cars. In subsection 2.1
we model this intertemporal choice problem. We model the consumersdiscounted expected
future fuel costs in the aggregate random coe¢ cients logit demand model of Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995). Our model accounts for heterogeneous responses because consumers may
di¤er in their annual mileage and hence in their expected future fuel costs. In subsection
6For example, Adamou, Clerides and Zachariadis (2014) estimate an aggregate demand system to assess
the e¤ects of feebates in Germany (combination of car subsidy for fuel e¢ cient cars with tax for fuel ine¢ cient
cars). They can look at the e¤ects on demand and consumer surplus, but not at the e¤ects on fuel usage since
they do not explicitly model consumer mileage. Huse and Lucinda (2014) consider the e¤ects of a Swedish
subsidy program to cars with su¢ ciently low CO2 emissions (where cars are more likely to be eligible if
they run on alternative fuels). They assess the e¤ects on demand and emissions, but without accounting for
mileage heterogeneity in the demand model.
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2.2 we use this demand model to discuss the di¤erent impact of two alternative taxes: a fuel
tax and a product tax on the carsfuel economy. This will serve as the basis to motivate our
demand specication and subsequent policy counterfactuals.
2.1 Demand
There are T markets, dened as country/year combinations, with It potential consumers in
each market t. Consumers are assumed to purchase a car only in the market where they are
located. To simplify notation, we suppress the market subscript t in this section.
We dene a car as a combination of a baseline model j and engine variant k. Consumer i
may either choose a car model j with engine variant k, or decide not to buy a car and consume
the outside good 0. The decision to buy a car a¤ects the intertemporal budget constraint
in two ways. First, consumers pay a capital cost, the initial purchase price pjk. Second, they
pay the present discounted value of expected future fuel costs Gijk. The conditional indirect
utility of consumer i for car model j and engine variant k is
uijk = xjk
x
i   i(pjk + Gijk) + jk + "ijk; (1)
where xjk is a vector of observed car and engine characteristics and jk is an unobserved
product characteristic. The vector xi captures individual-specic valuations for the product
characteristics, i is the marginal utility of income, and "ijk is a remaining individual-specic
valuation for car jk, modeled as an extreme value (logit) random variable. The utility of the
outside good is normalized to ui00 = "i00. The parameter  is Allcott and Wozny (2012)s
attention weightor future valuationparameter. If  = 1, consumers correctly trade o¤
the cars purchase price pjk against the present discounted value of future fuel costs Gijk.
If  < 1 consumers undervalue future payo¤s, and if  > 1 consumers overvalue the future
payo¤s.
Our main focus in (1) is on the specication of Gijk, i.e. consumer is present discounted
value of expected future fuel costs for model j with engine k. We allow fuel costs Gijk to be
consumer-specic because of heterogeneity in annual mileage. Furthermore, Gijk depends on
expected fuel prices,on the relevant time horizon and interest rate. More precisely, we dene
the present value of expected fuel costs over the cars lifetime as follows:
Gijk = E
"
S 1X
s=0
(1 + r) s mi ejkgks
#
; (2)
where (i) mi is consumer is expected annual mileage, measured in km; (ii) ejk is the inverse
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of the fuel economy of car j with engine k, measured in liter per km (or gallons per mile);
(iii) gks is the fuel price of engine type k (either gasoline or diesel fuel) at time s, measured
in e per liter; (iv) r is the interest rate at which consumers discount future fuel costs and
S is the time horizon over which consumers value fuel cost savings, which may be related to
the cars expected lifetime.7 We model annual mileage and expected future fuel costs in a
way that makes the expression for Gijk simple and identication transparent.
First, we allow annual mileage mi to be heterogeneous across consumers using the empir-
ical distribution of mileage. This addresses a sorting bias in aggregate demand models that
would arise if high mileage consumers choose to buy more fuel e¢ cient cars (as discussed
in Bento, Li and Roth, 2012). It also enables us to assess how consumers with di¤erent
mileage respond to alternative tax policies.8 Our specication assumes that annual mileage
mi is perfectly inelastic, i.e. independent of the fuel price. Empirical evidence shows that the
driving behavior is indeed relatively inelastic; see e.g. Goldberg (1998), Hughes, Knittel and
Sperling (2008), Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen and von Haefen (2009), and Gillingham (2012).
If we would allow driving behavior to depend on fuel prices, our result that a fuel tax is more
e¤ective than a product tax would be strengthened.
Second, we assume that fuel prices for each engine type k, gks, follow a random walk,
so the consumersexpected fuel price at time s is equal to the current fuel price (at time
s = 0): E [gks] = gk. This assumption is consistent with recent ndings of Anderson, Kellogg
and Sallee (2013). Some studies have instead considered alternative models for expectations
about future fuel prices (based on actual future prices or past prices). In a literature review
Alquist, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) conclude that these more complicated models do not
appear to outperform models with expectations that are only based on current prices.
Under these assumptions, we can rewrite the present value of expected future fuel costs
for consumer i buying car j with engine k as
Gijk = 
m
i ejkgk; (3)
i.e. consumer is annual mileage mi (in km) times the inverse of fuel economy ejk (in
7In practice, vehicle lifetime may not be xed but may partly depend on mileage.
8Other work has accounted for mileage heterogeneity by using micro-level data, see e.g. Bento et al. (2009)
and Gillingham (2012) for the U.S. market. Allcott and Wozny (2012) account for mileage heterogeneity in
an aggregate nested logit model by measuring average annual mileage per car model. Their approach does
not however allow for policy counterfactuals, since it does not account for the possibility that consumers
with di¤erent mileages substitute to other cars in response to tax policies.
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liter/km) times the current fuel price gk (in e/liter)km times a capitalization coe¢ cient :
 
S 1X
s=0
(1 + r) s =
1 + r
r
h
1  (1 + r) S
i
; (4)
which converts the annual fuel cost mi ejkgk into a net present value. Intuitively, the capi-
talization coe¢ cient  measures the extent to which consumers trade o¤ the initial purchase
price of a car against annual fuel costs, and lies in the interval [1; S]. If consumers are fully
myopic (r ! 1), then  = 1: consumers then give the same weight to current annual fuel
costs as to the initial purchase price. In contrast, if consumers do not discount the future
(r ! 0), then  = S. Consumers then weigh the current annual fuel costs by a factor S
relative to the purchase price of the car: they count on a pay-back timeS when investing
in a car with a higher fuel economy.
We can substitute (3) into (1) to write consumer is conditional indirect utility for car
model j and engine variant k as
uijk = xjk
x
i   i(pjk + mi ejkgk) + jk + "ijk: (5)
This is close to a standard random coe¢ cients utility specication, where i = (
x
i ; i; 
m
i )
are the random coe¢ cients for which means and (co)variances may be estimated. The
future valuation parameter  and the capitalization coe¢ cient  are additional parameters,
but they are not separately identied from the scale of mi . We will therefore make use of
prior information on the empirical distribution of mileage mi in our empirical analysis, so
that  becomes identied from the scale of mi .
One can then use (4), to interpret the estimate of  in three di¤erent ways. First, as
in Hausman (1979), one can retrieve the consumersimplicit interest rate r at which they
discount the future, for a given value of the cars expected lifetime S and setting  = 1.
Second, one can retrieve the consumersrequired pay-back time S, assuming they adopt a
market interest rate r and again setting  = 1. Third, as in Allcott and Wozny (2012),
one can impose both a market interest rate r and an expected lifetime S to retrieve the
attention weight parameter , measuring the extent to which consumers undervalue ( < 1)
or overvalue the future ( > 1). We will focus on the third approach.
We complete the demand model by assuming that each consumer i chooses the model
j with engine k that maximizes her utility out of all possible alternatives in the choice
set (including the outside option). Furthermore, assume that the random coe¢ cients i =
(xi ; i; 
m
i ) come from a distribution F(; ), where  are means and (co)variance para-
meters to be estimated; assume also that i is independent of the individual- and product-
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specic taste valuations "ijk, which come from the type I extreme value distribution. Under
these assumptions, the predicted market share for model j with engine k is the probability
that jk gives the highest utility:
sjk (; ; ) =
Z

exp(xjk
x   (pjk + mejkgk) + jk)
1 +
PJ
j0
PKj0
k0=1 exp(xj0k0
x   (pj0k0 + mej0k0gk0) + j0k0)
dF(; ): (6)
Observed sales can then be set equal to the predicted market share times the number of
potential consumers I, i.e. qjk = sjk (; ; ) I. Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)
and subsequent work, the market shares can be approximated by Monte Carlo simulation
with R draws of i = (
x
i ; i; 
m
i ) from the distribution F(; ).
2.2 Consumer responses to taxes
We will estimate the demand model to compare the e¤ectiveness of two alternative taxes: a
fuel tax and a product tax on the carsfuel economy. We will do this comparison in detail
in our policy counterfactuals after having estimated the demand model. In this section, we
give an overview of the possible e¤ects of both taxes on the composition of new car sales.
This provides economic intuition and will highlight the specic features that need careful
attention in our empirical specication.
A fuel tax tGk is a tax on gasoline and/or diesel fuel gk, whereas the product tax t
E
k is a tax
on the (inverse) fuel economy ejk of a car. The product tax on fuel economy ejk is equivalent
to the commonly used product tax on a cars CO2 emissions, since there is a proportional
relationship between both. The two taxes a¤ect a consumers conditional indirect utility (5)
as follows:
uijk = xjk
x
i   i
 
pjk + t
E
k ejk
  imi ejk  gk + tGk + jk + "ijk:
Previous work has stressed the relative advantages of both taxes. On the one hand, a
fuel tax is preferable because it directly reduces usage and hence (pollution) externalities,
as long as driving behavior is not perfectly inelastic. On the other hand, a product tax on
the least fuel e¢ cient cars can be preferable if consumers undervalue their future fuel costs
when purchasing a durable good. Put di¤erently, a fuel tax mainly serves to correct for
externalities by a¤ecting the driving decision, while a product tax on fuel economy mainly
corrects for an investment ine¢ ciency from consumer myopia. Allcott and Greenstone (2012)
provide interesting further discussion of both e¤ects (where they focus on a subsidy for the
energy e¢ cient product, instead of a tax on the energy ine¢ cient product).
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In our analysis we assume that utilization is perfectly inelastic, so we rule out the pos-
sibility that a fuel tax corrects for an externality by reducing utilization. We instead focus
on another role of fuel taxes: in the presence of consumer mileage heterogeneity, a fuel tax
especially targets the high mileage consumers. Hence, a fuel tax may be more e¤ective than
a product tax even if it does not directly a¤ect utilization decisions.
To more precisely see the role of mileage heterogeneity and consumer myopia in the
e¤ectiveness of a fuel tax versus a product tax, it is useful to consider the case where the
taxes do not depend on the fuel type k, i.e. tGk = t
G and tEk = t
E for both gasoline and diesel
cars. Using qjk = sjk (; ; ) I and the expression (6) for sjk (; ; ), Appendix A shows that
a small increase of tG and tE has the following e¤ect on the demand for product jk:
@qjk
@tG
=  
Z

i
m
i sijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I
@qjk
@tE
=  
Z

isijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I
where ei =
P
j
P
k ejksijk= (1  si0) is the expected fuel economy over cars purchased by
consumer i. We can make the following two observations.
First, the e¤ect of both taxes depends on the sign of the term ejk   ei + si0ei. If all cars
would have the same fuel economy, i.e. ejk = e for all jk, then ejk   ei = 0.9 Both taxes
would then reduce the demand for all cars, proportional to the aggregate consumer responses
to the outside good si0 and the price sensitivity parameter i. The e¤ect of the taxes is then
similar to the e¤ect of an industry-wide price increase. In contrast, if cars di¤er in their fuel
economy, then the demand for some cars can increase despite the tax increase. This will be
the case for cars with a su¢ ciently low inverse fuel economy, i.e. ejk < ei, and when there
is limited substitution to the outside good (si0 small). In sum, both taxes have in common
that they change the composition of new car sales from cars with a low fuel economy (high
ejk) to cars with a high fuel economy (low ejk).
Second, the e¤ect of the taxes di¤er because of two factors. On the one hand, a fuel tax
tG may be less e¤ective than a product tax on fuel economy tE if there is consumer myopia
( < 1). This is the investment ine¢ ciency referred to above. On the other hand, a fuel tax
may be more e¤ective because of mileage heterogeneity mi : a fuel tax especially targets the
high mileage consumers to substitute to more fuel e¢ cient cars. In the special case where
there is no consumer heterogeneity, it can be shown that a revenue-equivalent product tax
tE has exactly the same e¤ect as a fuel tax tG if and only if  = 1. It has a stronger (weaker)
9When ejk = e, we have
ei = e
P
j
P
k sijk= (1  si0) = e, so that indeed ejk   ei = 0.
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impact if and only if there is undervaluation (overvaluation).
In sum, the e¤ectiveness of both taxes is an empirical question. The above discussion
highlighted the importance of several factors: the price sensitivity parameter i and the
extent substitution to the outside good si0 determine the general e¤ectiveness of both taxes
(similar to their role in a price elasticity of industry demand). The future fuel valuation para-
meter  and the extent of mileage heterogeneity mi explain di¤erences in their e¤ectiveness.
We will pay particular attention to these various features in our empirical specication.
3 Data
Our main dataset is a rich panel of data from the European car market, obtained from a mar-
ket research rm (JATO). The dataset includes the sales, prices, and product characteristics
for every new passenger car sold during 1998-2011 in seven European countries: Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. The data cover around 90% of
the sales in the European Union.
The unit of observation is at the very detailed level of the car variant jk, i.e. the
combination of a car model j equipped with engine k. The car model j is a brand/model/body
type combination, e.g. Volkswagen Golf hatchback, whereas the engine k consists of the
fuel engine type (gasoline or diesel), displacement and horsepower, e.g. gasoline, 1,390cc,
59kW. Our highly disaggregate denition of a car variant make it possible to capture
all possible variation in fuel e¢ ciency and engine performance. After excluding cars with
extremely low sales (e.g. Bentley Arnage), we retain on average about 800 car variants per
country/year, i.e. 180 models with on average 4.4 engines. This results in a panel dataset of
approximately 80,000 observations (car variants/countries/years).
Sales are dened as new vehicle registrations. Prices are suggested retail prices, including
VAT and registration taxes which di¤er across markets and engines (separately obtained from
the European Automobile Manufacturers Association). As discussed below, we include a rich
set of xed e¤ects for car models and countries/years to account for car-specic discounts and
variation across countries and over time. Car characteristics include measures of vehicle size
(curb weight, width, length and height), engine performance (horsepower and displacement)
and (inverse) fuel economy (liter/100km). In addition, based on a brands perceived country
of origin, we construct a dummy for whether a model is of foreign or domestic origin in each
country.10
We supplement this dataset with information on fuel prices, the empirical distribution
10For example, the Volkswagen Golf is perceived as domestic by German consumers even though part of
the production of Golf takes place in Spain.
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of annual miles travelled and other country/year-level information. Gasoline and diesel fuel
prices by year and country are from the Directorate General for Economic and Financial
A¤airs. Fuel prices mainly vary over time, rather than across countries. Figure 1 plots the
average annual price of gasoline and diesel fuel during 19982011 (in real year 2000 Euros).
Both gasoline and diesel fuel prices are increasing to reach peaks in 2008 and 2011. Diesel
fuel is on average 16% less expensive than gasoline fuel, but the gap varies during the period.
There is also variation in gasoline and diesel prices across countries.
The empirical distribution of annual miles travelled is from the 2007 UK National Travel
Survey, a rich nationally representative survey of 20,000 individuals.11 According to this
survey, average annual mileage is 14,700 km/year. The distribution of mileage is skewed
to the right: 20% of the population drives less than 7,000 km/year, 50% drives less than
10,200 km/year, 80% drives less than 18,000 km/year, while 10% drives more than 25,000
km/year. There is no such detailed information on the empirical mileage distribution in
other countries of our dataset. Eurostat reports average annual mileages by country, using
somewhat di¤ering methodologies. These averages are in line with the most reliable average
of the distribution reported in the UK National Travel Survey. We therefore assume that
mileage in the other countries follows the same distribution as in the UK. Finally, we use
information on GDP/capita in each country/year to scale car prices and annual fuel costs
in the same units across countries, and we use population per country/year to construct the
variable for the number of potential consumers.
Summary statistics Table 1 provides summary statistics (mean and standard deviation)
for the variables included in our empirical demand model. As one may expect, character-
istics that may vary across both models and engines (price, horsepower, annual fuel costs)
show a higher dispersion around the mean than characteristics that only vary across models
(size, height and the foreign dummy). Furthermore, several characteristics show considerable
changes over the sample period: horsepower, fuel e¢ ciency and the fraction of diesel cars all
increased between 19982011, whereas prices (relative to income) remained fairly stable.
Table 2 provides more detailed summary statistics broken down between gasoline and
diesel cars. This breakdown is informative, since the di¤erences between both types of cars
form a main source of variation to identify the willingness to pay for fuel cost savings. The
share of new diesel cars increased from 31.7% in 1998 to 57.7% in 2011.12 There were on
11www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-transport/series/national-travel-survey-
statistics
12This trend is common to all European countries, but there are also notable di¤erences across countries
(not shown in the table). Belgium, France and Spain reached the highest share of diesel cars in 2011
(respectively 75.2%, 69.0% and 69.0%), whereas the Netherlands had the lowest share (30.5%). The shares
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average only 1.6 diesel engines per car in 1998 (compared with 2.5 gasoline engines per car),
and this number increased to 2.5 diesel engines per car in 2011. Hence, while a considerable
fraction of car models was not sold with a diesel engine in 1998, this was no longer the
case in 2011. Diesel cars have 19% higher fuel e¢ ciency than gasoline cars (on average 4.8
liter/100km for diesel cars versus 5.7 liter/100km for gasoline cars in 2011). Furthermore,
as mentioned above, diesel fuel tends to be 16% less expensive than gasoline fuel costs. At
the same time, a diesel car is on average 29% more expensive than its gasoline counterpart.
This varying trade-o¤ between the higher up-front purchase price for diesel cars and the
higher expected fuel cost savings across car models/countries and years will be of primary
importance to identify the extent to which consumers discount the future.
4 Estimation
We have a panel of T markets, dened as country-year combinations, to estimate the taste
parameters of the market share system (6). We reintroduce the subscript t to refer to these
markets. For each market t and each car model j with engine k, we observe the sales qjkt,
prices pjkt, fuel economy ejkt, a vector of other product characteristics xjkt and the fuel
price gkt (gasoline or diesel fuel). The observed market shares are computed as the sales qjkt
divided by the number of potential consumers It, sjkt = qjkt=It, and these observed shares
are set equal to the predicted shares as given by (6).
We rst discuss the specication of the taste parameters. Next, we discuss the assump-
tions regarding the error term jk and the GMM estimator. Finally, we discuss specic
computational aspects of the estimator.
Specication of the taste parameters The taste parameters to be estimated are 
and , where  measures the extent to which consumers trade o¤ the initial purchase price
of a car against annual fuel costs, and  is a vector of distributional parameters for the
random coe¢ cients i = (
x
i ; i; 
m
i ) with distribution F(; ). Recall that 
x
i measures
the individual-specic valuations for the product characteristics xjkt, i is the marginal
utility of income, and mi is consumer is annual mileage. As discussed in section 2,  is
not separately identied from the scale of mi . Furthermore, estimating a large number of
distributional parameters , i.e. means and (co)variances, is computationally challenging, so
we impose a number of restrictions.
of diesel cars in the other countries varied between 45.5% and 55.4%. These di¤erences may stem from
unobserved country-specic factors, such as taxes or fuel station networks. To account for this, we interact
the diesel variation with country-specic xed e¤ects.
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First, we assume that mi follows the empirical distribution of mileage based on the
information discussed in section 3. This avoids a restrictive functional form and also ensures
identication of . Second, following the previous literature, we assume xi is normally
distributed and we only estimate means and standard deviations of xi , so we restrict their
covariances to be equal to zero:
xi = 
x
+ xxi ;
where 
x
are the mean valuations,  is a diagonal matrix with standard deviations x on the
diagonal, and xi are standard normal random variables. We nevertheless allow for a nonzero
covariance between the intercept 0i and 
m
i through a parameter 
0m. This allows for the
possibility that the high mileage consumers are also more likely to purchase a car than to
purchase the outside good. A higher mileage decreases utility through higher fuel costs but
can increase utility through a higher value on the interaction with the intercept. Depending
on which e¤ect dominates we expect to see di¤erent shares of the outside good for di¤erent
mileages. Third, we specify i to be inversely proportional to income yt in market t, so
i = =yt.13
The specication of the conditional indirect utility of consumer i for car model j and
engine variant k then becomes
uijkt = xjkt
x
i   pjkt=yt   mi ejktgkt=yt + jkt + "ijkt: (7)
We will directly estimate and report  as the fuel cost parameter, and then retrieve
the future valuation parameter  from dividing the estimate of  by the estimate of the
price parameter  and a value of the capitalization coe¢ cient  (using the interest rate r
and time horizon S). The vector of product characteristics xjkt includes horsepower, size
(width times length), height, foreign, and a diesel dummy variable interacted by country
dummy variables. The latter captures valuation di¤erences for diesel engines across countries,
including unobserved di¤erences in taxation or in fuel station networks for diesel cars. We
estimate mean valuations x for all these variables, and in addition standard deviations
x for horsepower and a covariance parameter 0m. We also considered a more general
specication with standard deviations for the other characteristics: this gives similar results,
13Similar to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), this specication approximates a Cobb-Douglas specica-
tion  ln (yt   pjkt   mi ejktgkt)  yt pjkt=yt mi ejktgkt=yt, when capitalized car expenditures
are small relative to capitalized income. It is particularly convenient in our setting with many countries
with di¤ering exchange rates, because prices and fuel expenditures are expressed in local prices relative
to local income. We also considered a specication where i follows the empirical distribution of income,
i = =yi, in a simpler specication with fewer other random coe¢ cients. This produced similar results,
but was computationally much slower, so we focus on the model where i = =yt and a richer set of other
random coe¢ cients.
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but less precise estimates for some our main parameters of interest . This is consistent with
earlier ndings of Reynaert and Verboven (2014) on the di¢ culties in precisely estimating
too many random coe¢ cient parameters.
GMM estimator We exploit the panel nature of our dataset and specify the unobserved
product characteristic as
jkt = j + t + ejkt; (8)
where j are xed e¤ects capturing time-invariant unobserved characteristics for a car model
j, and t captures market xed e¤ects, modeled as country-specic xed e¤ects interacted
with a time trend and a squared time trend. Since some models where introduced or elimi-
nated within a year, we also include a set of xed e¤ects for the number of months for which
the model was available in a country within a given year. The last term, ejkt, is the residual
error term capturing the remaining unobserved characteristics varying across models, engines
and markets.
The error terms ejkt enter the market share system (6) in a highly nonlinear way. Follow-
ing Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and the subsequent literature, we use
a contraction mapping to invert the market share system and solve for the vector of error
terms et in each market t.
We account for the fact that price is an endogenous variable, which may be correlated
with the error term ejkt. The main identication assumption is that the error term is mean
independent of the other product characteristics, E(ejktjzt) = 0, where zt is a matrix of
all other product characteristics (including xt, but also fuel economy et and fuel prices gt).
These conditional moment restrictions imply an innite number of unconditional moment
restrictions
E

hjt(xt)ejkt = 0
where hjt(xt) is a vector of instruments formed by any function of the exogenous xt. The
GMM estimator for the complete vector of parameters is then the solution to
min

e()0h(z)0
h(z)e();
where the vectors and matrices are stacked over all markets,  is the vector of parameters (
and ) and 
 is a weighting matrix using rst-step residuals to account for heteroskedastic-
ity.14 To construct the instruments h(z), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) suggest to use
14To minimize the objective function, we concentrate out the linear parameters  and the market xed
e¤ects t as discussed in Nevo (1999). Furthermore, following Baltagi (1995), we use a within transformation
of the data to eliminate the car model xed e¤ects j .
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the own-product characteristics, sums of the characteristics of other products of the same
rm, and sums of characteristics of other rmsproducts. We use these instruments in a
rst stage to obtain initial parameter estimates and construct optimal instruments following
Chamberlain (1987) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999). In a second stage, we use these
optimal instruments to obtain more e¢ cient parameter estimates. Reynaert and Verboven
(2014) provide detailed Monte Carlo evidence and an application with actual data to demon-
strate that optimal instruments indeed greatly improve the e¢ ciency of the estimator for
this model.
Computational considerations We account for a variety of computational issues to
which recent work has drawn attention (see for example Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013)s
checklist). First, we approximate the high-dimension market share integral using 500 draws
of a quasi-random number sequence for each of the 98 market. The empirical distribution of
mileage consists of 100 nodes, such that each mileage is interacted with 5 draws on the other
dimensions. Second, we use a tight convergence level of 1e 12 for the contraction mapping to
solve the market share system in the inner loop within the GMM objective function. Third,
to minimize the GMM objective function we use a state-of-the-art optimization algorithm
(the Interior/Direct algorithm in Knitro), provide analytical derivatives and set a strict
tolerance level at 1e 6. Fourth, we use a set of 50 starting values to search for a global
minimum, and verify the solution by checking the rst-order and second-order conditions.
Finally, as discussed above, we use optimal instruments in a second stage, which greatly
improves the e¢ ciency of the estimator, in particular for the standard deviations of the
random coe¢ cients.
5 Empirical results
To assess how ignoring heterogeneity of consumer preferences may bias the extent to which
consumers trade o¤ the car purchase price against future fuel cost savings, we consider three
alternative models. The rst model is a simple logit model which imposes xi = 
x and
mi = 
m (i.e. the mean of the observed mileage distribution). The second model allows
for heterogeneity in mileage and hence in the valuation of fuel costs, using the empirical
mileage distribution mi , while continuing to restrict 
x
i = 
x. The third model is our full
random coe¢ cients model which allows for both mileage heterogeneity and heterogeneity
in the valuations of some other car characteristics. This model also allows mileage to be
correlated with the utility for a car relative to the outside good (covariance parameter 0m).
We rst discuss the parameter estimates, and then what these imply for consumers
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valuations of future fuel cost savings.
Parameter estimates Table 3 reports the parameter estimates for these three demand
models. First consider the simple logit model. Price and annual fuel costs have the expected
negative e¤ect on utility, with  =  4:54 and  =  39:90. This implies  = 8:78, which
we discuss in detail below. The estimated mean valuations x for horsepower, size (length
times width) and height are positive, while the mean valuation for foreign cars is negative.
The valuation of a diesel engine (apart from fuel costs) di¤ers across countries (not shown
in table): diesel cars have a lower mean utility in Germany, the UK and especially in the
Netherlands. This may be due to unobserved higher car taxes, less elaborated diesel fuel
station network, the popularity of alternative fuels (such as LPG in the Netherlands) or
other unobserved preference di¤erences.
Now consider the random coe¢ cients logit model with only mileage heterogeneity, and
no heterogeneity for other characteristics. Price and fuel costs again have the expected
negative e¤ect on utility, but the magnitude of the fuel cost e¤ect increases ( =  5:20 and
 =  67:93). The estimated mean valuations of the other product characteristics x all
have the same signs and are similar in magnitude as in the simple logit model.
Finally, consider the full random coe¢ cients logit with heterogeneity for other charac-
teristics (x) in additional to fuel costs. As in the other two models, price and fuel costs
have a negative e¤ect on utility. Similarly, the mean valuation for size and height is positive,
while the mean valuation for foreign cars is negative. The mean valuation for horsepower now
becomes negative. But there is substantial heterogeneity around this mean, implying that
about 21% of consumers value horsepower positively. Finally, the covariance parameter 0m
is positive. This means that high mileage consumers show a positive preference for buying
cars relative to purchasing the outside good.15
Implications for valuation of future fuel cost savings What do our estimates imply
for consumersvaluations of future fuel cost savings? To address this question, the starting
point is the coe¢ cient , which converts annual fuel costs into the present discounted
value. It is simply the ratio of the estimated fuel cost coe¢ cient  over the estimated
price coe¢ cient . As discussed above, we can then use the expression of  given by (4) to
15Note that the standard deviations of the random coe¢ cients are precisely estimated due to the use
of optimal instruments. Our rst-stage estimates, where we used sums of product characteristics of other
products as an approximation for the optimal instruments, produced much less signicant estimates, similar
to what was found in Reynaert and Verboven (2014). As reported above, we also considered a richer
specication with other random coe¢ cients. This gave comparable results, though the estimates of  and
 are less precise.
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draw conclusions about consumersintertemporal preferences. More specically, we follow
Allcott and Wozny (2012), and assume a time horizon S and market interest rate r to obtain
a value for  and retrieve the attention weight or future valuation parameter : this measures
the extent to which consumers undervalue ( < 1) or overvalue the future ( > 1).16
The bottom panel of Table 3 compares the ndings for the three di¤erent demand models.
To compute , we set r = 6% as in Allcott and Wozny (2012) and assume a time horizon
S = 15: this is at the higher end of Eurostat estimates of expected vehicle life between
S = 10 and S = 15, which makes it more likely to nd undervaluation of future payo¤s.17
The logit model implies that  = 8:78, which is precisely estimated with a standard
error of 0.55. Setting  = 1 and r = 0, this can be interpreted as a required payback time of
8.78 years for an investment in a more fuel e¢ cient car. Equivalently, using the above values
of r and S, the implied attention weight parameter is  = 0:85, which implies a moderate
undervaluation of future fuel cost savings.
In contrast, the random coe¢ cients logit model with only mileage heterogeneity implies a
considerably larger coe¢ cient of  = 13:05 and a corresponding attention weight parameter
of  = 1:27. This implies that consumers overvalue future fuel cost savings according to
this model. This nding is consistent with Bento, Li and Roth (2012): they show, both
analytically and through simulation, that ignoring heterogeneous responses to fuel cost leads
to a sorting bias and a corresponding underestimate of consumerswillingness to pay for
future fuel cost savings. Intuitively, high mileage consumers sort into cars with better fuel
economy, and ignoring this amounts to omitting a variable that is positively correlated with
fuel costs.
Finally, the full model, which also allows for heterogeneity in the valuation of other
product characteristics, results in a coe¢ cient of  = 9:03, so that the attention weight
parameter is  = 0:88. This again implies some moderate (but statistically insignicant)
undervaluation of future fuel cost savings, as in the simple logit model. Hence, omitting
some dimensions of heterogeneity turns out to introduce another bias in the estimation of
consumer sensitivity to fuel costs: fuel economy is highly correlated with other characteristics
such as horsepower, for which preferences are also heterogeneous. The results show that not
accounting for heterogeneity on other characteristics results in an additional bias, which goes
in the reverse direction of Bento, Li and Roth (2012)s sorting bias.
16As discussed above, we could equivalently set  = 1 and either assume a time horizon S to retrieve
the consumersimplicit interest rate r, as in Hausman (1979); or assume an interest rate r to retrieve the
consumersrequired payback time S.
17Allcott and Wozny (2012) use a richer model for vehicle life, allowing for an annual depreciation rate.
In principle, we could also adopt such an approach, but this would make the expressions less transparent
and make the model more di¢ cult to estimate. It is in any case not clear whether consumers are su¢ ciently
sophisticated to incorporate all this information.
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In all models, the consumer surplus losses per vehicle from misoptimization are small:
e50 from undervaluation in the rst model, e112 from overvaluation in the second model,
and e22 from undervaluation in the third model. Note that this type of low undervaluation
may be interpreted as rational inattention from the consumerspoint of view, if it is costly
to compute future fuel savings exactly, see Sallee (2014).
In sum, to obtain reliable estimates on consumersvaluations of future fuel cost savings,
it is important to account for both mileage heterogeneity and heterogeneity regarding other
product characteristics than fuel costs. We nd only moderate undervaluation with an
attention weight of  = 0:88 for European consumers. This is similar to Busse, Knittel and
Zettelmeyer (2013), and higher than the  = 0:76 obtained by Allcott and Wozny (2012).
As such, the European car market shows only very limited evidence for an energy paradox
according to which consumers are puzzlingly slow in investing in energy e¢ ciency (Ja¤e
and Stavins, 1994). A possible explanation is the rather high fuel prices in Europe, which
makes it more protable for consumers to pay attention to future fuel costs. Furthermore,
almost every car comes with either a gasoline engine and a diesel engine (with a higher initial
purchase price, but also lower future fuel costs): this makes it easier to compare products
that are otherwise nearly identical (see also Verboven, 2002). We now turn to the question
what these ndings imply for the e¤ectiveness of alternative tax policies.
6 Policy counterfactuals
As shown in the previous section, to obtain reliable estimates of consumersvaluations of
future fuel cost savings it is important to account for consumer heterogeneity, both regarding
their mileage and other dimensions. What do our ndings imply for the e¤ectiveness of
alternative government policies?
Overview: fuel tax versus product tax There is a large literature on the environmental
e¤ects of alternative tax and standards policies in the automobile market, and we do not
aim to provide a comprehensive analysis on how these various policies may a¤ect all di¤erent
externalities.18 Instead, we focus on the e¤ectiveness of two tax policies, in terms of their
reduction in total fuel usage: a fuel tax tGk (on gasoline and/or diesel fuel) and a product tax
tEk (on a cars inverse fuel economy ejk). Both taxes are representative for a broader group
of policies that governments can use in order to reduce externalities. A fuel tax is equivalent
18Parry, Walls and Harrington (2007) and Anderson, Parry, Sallee and Fischer (2011) provide a compre-
hensive overviews of di¤erent (pollution and environmental) externalities and di¤erent policies to address
them.
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to a carbon tax and can be seen as a Pigouvian tax that directly prices the externality. A
product tax changes the relative prices of products with di¤erent e¢ ciencies and will have
similar e¤ects as subsidies for e¢ cient vehicles, feebates or fuel economy standards.
In section 2, we already discussed how the e¤ectiveness of both policies depends on
various factors. The price sensitivity parameter i and the extent of substitution to the
outside good si0 determine the general e¤ectiveness of both taxes (similar to their role in a
price elasticity of industry demand). The future valuation parameter  and the extent of
mileage heterogeneity mi explain di¤erences in e¤ectiveness between the fuel tax and the
product tax. Without mileage heterogeneity (mi = 
m
for all consumers i), a product tax
is more e¤ective than a fuel tax if and only if  < 1, because consumers respond more to
an immediate incentive. However, if there is mileage heterogeneity, a fuel tax may be more
e¤ective, because it better targets the high mileage consumers to substitute to cars with
better fuel economy.19
We will rst compare the e¤ects of both policies on the composition of new sales, i.e. on
the market shares by fuel economy quartile. Next, we compare the e¤ects of both taxes on
the average fuel economy and total fuel usage of sold cars. Finally, we discuss the e¤ects
of discriminatory taxes that are specic to the fuel type (gasoline versus diesel in our case),
and where the role of fuel taxes to target heterogeneous consumers is even more important.
In most counterfactuals, we will consider the e¤ects of a fuel tax of 50c per liter. This is
of a roughly similar order of magnitude as the fuel tax of 1$ per gallon considered in several
US studies. We will then compare this with the e¤ects of a revenue-equivalent product tax
per unit of fuel economy ejk (in liter/100km). A product tax is revenue equivalent if it gives
the same revenues as the capitalized expected revenues from a 50c tax per unit of fuel (in
liter). We mainly focus on the results for Germany in 2011, the largest country in the most
recent year of our dataset. Computational details are given in Appendix A.
E¤ects on the composition of new car sales We rst discuss how a fuel tax and
a revenue-equivalent product tax a¤ect the composition of new car sales. We specically
compute the e¤ect of both taxes on the sales of every car jk, and then aggregate these
e¤ects to market share e¤ects of four fuel economy quartiles. This is similar to what Busse,
Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2013) report, based on an entirely di¤erent identication approach.
Since our approach is based on the estimates of a structural demand model, we can report
interesting additional information. First, Busse et al. only show the impact of a fuel tax on
19As discussed in section 2, a fuel tax may also be more e¤ective because it can inuence driving behavior
if consumer mileage is not perfectly inelastic. We rule this out to focus on the role of mileage heterogeneity
in the e¤ectiveness of a fuel tax.
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the market shares by fuel economy quartile, whereas we can compare this with the impact of
a (revenue-equivalent) product tax. Second, we can compute the market share e¤ects under
both the actual estimate of the consumersfuture valuation parameter ( = 0:87), and under
alternative scenarios with full forward looking behavior ( = 1) and strong consumer myopia
( = 0:5). This detailed comparison is useful, since it introduces some key intuition behind
the subsequent e¤ects on fuel economy, total fuel usage and consumer welfare.
Table 4 shows the market share e¤ects by fuel economy quartile, based on the estimates
of the full model with heterogeneity in both mileage and in the valuation of other product
characteristics. For completeness, Appendix B also shows the results for the simple logit
model without mileage heterogeneity, and we briey comment on this rst. As expected from
our earlier analysis in section 2, in the absence of mileage heterogeneity a fuel tax of 50c
per liter has exactly the same impact on market shares as a revenue-equivalent product tax
when consumers are fully forward looking ( = 1), while it is less e¤ective when consumers
undervalue the future ( < 1).20
We now discuss the market share e¤ects for the full model with consumer heterogeneity.
According to the top panel of Table 4, under the actual future valuation parameter ( = 0:87)
a 50c fuel tax increase raises the market share of cars in the highest fuel economy quartile
(lowest ejk) by 12% (or 4.4 percentage points, from a market share of 36.6% to 41.0%). The
market shares of the other fuel economy quartiles all drop. In particular, the market share
of cars in the lowest fuel economy quartile (highest ejk) drop by 16.1%. Hence, a fuel price
increase implies a quite considerable change in the composition of car sales from the low to
high fuel economy cars. If consumers would be fully forward looking ( = 1), then the 50c
fuel tax increase would have been only slightly more e¤ective: it would raise the market share
of the highest fuel economy quartile by 13.3% and reduce the market share of the lowest
fuel economy quartile by 17.7%.21 Conversely, with strong consumer myopia ( = 0:5) the
fuel tax increase would have had a smaller, but still non-negligible impact: +7.3% for the
highest fuel economy quartile and 10.1% for the lowest fuel economy quartile.
The bottom part compares these ndings with those of a revenue-equivalent product
tax increase. This amounts to a tax per unit of fuel economy of e767 per unit of ejk (so
this would amount to a product tax of e3,835 for a car that consumes 5 liter per 100km).
As expected, the product tax does not become less e¤ective when the future valuation
20In the logit model, this revenue-neutral product tax is equal to e890 per liter/100km. For example, the
product tax on a car that consumes 5 liter/100km amounts to e4,450.
21These numbers are somewhat lower, but still of a comparable order of magnitude as those in Busse,
Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2013), based on an entirely di¤erent identication approach. They nd a market
share change by +21% for highest fuel economy quartile and by 27% for lowest quartile). This larger impact
may be because of a generally larger cost sensitivity (with respect to prices and fuel costs) in the U.S., or
because of a di¤erent identication approach.
21
parameter  decreases. Most interestingly, under the actual estimate of  = 0:87, the
product tax increase appears to have a lower e¤ect on the composition of new car sales
than the fuel tax. On the one hand, a product tax would be more e¤ective because of the
modest consumer myopia. But on the other hand, a product tax does not target low and
high mileage consumers di¤erently, and this e¤ect turns out to dominate. As a result, the
product tax is also less e¤ective in altering the composition of new car sales if consumers
would be fully forward looking ( = 1). In contrast, with strong consumer myopia ( = 0:5)
the product tax becomes more e¤ective than the fuel tax.
E¤ects on average fuel economy and total fuel usage Table 5 shows what these sales
composition e¤ects imply for the average fuel economy and the total annual fuel usage of
new sold cars. While we are mainly interested in the e¤ects based on the parameters of the
full model, we also compare the results with the simple logit model that does not include
mileage and other heterogeneity. Since both models imply only modest (and statistically
insignicant) undervaluation, the table no longer shows how the results would change if we
would have fully forward-looking behavior ( = 1) or strong myopia, but the results are
available in Appendix B.
The rst two columns of Table 5 show the e¤ects of the taxes on average fuel economy and
total annual fuel usage, conditional on consumers continuing to purchase a car (rather than
substituting to the outside good). In the simple logit model without mileage heterogeneity,
the fuel tax reduces average fuel economy and total annual fuel usage by exactly the same
amount, i.e. by 2.0%. The product tax is more e¤ective since it reduces average fuel economy
and total fuel usage by 2.7%. This bigger impact is due the (modest) undervaluation of future
fuel costs ( = 0:87).
The results are rather di¤erent in the full model with mileage and other sources of
heterogeneity. First, the fuel tax reduces average fuel economy by 1.3%, but reduces total
fuel usage by a much larger 1.8%. This is because the fuel tax mainly targets the high mileage
consumers, who are most likely to substitute to cars with a better fuel economy.22 Second,
the product tax reduces both average fuel economy and total fuel usage by 1.6%: the product
tax is therefore more e¤ective than the fuel tax in reducing average fuel economy, but less
e¤ective in reducing total fuel usage. This contrasts with our nding for the simple logit,
where the product tax seemed to be more e¤ective in reducing fuel usage. In sum, despite
the consumersmodest undervaluation of future fuel costs, a product tax is on balance less
e¤ective than a fuel tax because it cannot target high mileage consumers under mileage
22This is conrmed from the breakdown by mileage quartile: the lowest mileage quartile reduces fuel usage
by only 0.7%, while the largest quartile reduces total fuel usage by 2.5% (not shown in the table).
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heterogeneity.
The last two columns show what the taxes imply for total fuel usage, allowing consumers
to substitute to the outside good. First notice that the logit model implies an implausibly
large substitution to the outside good: the market share of the outside good increases by
10% points after a fuel tax, and even by 13% points after a revenue-equivalent product tax.
The full model implies smaller substitution to the outside good, by +5% points for both
taxes. This smaller substitution follows from our earlier empirical nding that high mileage
consumers tend to have a higher valuation for buying a new car rather than the outside good
(positive covariance parameter 0m).
These di¤erences for outside good substitution translate into di¤erent e¤ects of both
taxes on total fuel usage. The simple logit model implies an implausibly large reduction in
total fuel usage by 32.8% after the fuel tax and by up to 42.8% for the revenue-equivalent
product tax (where the larger e¤ect of the product tax again stems from the modest consumer
myopia). In contrast, the full model with consumer heterogeneity implies more reasonable
reductions in total fuel usage: the fuel tax lowers total annual fuel usage by 14.2% and the
product tax reduces it by 12.6%. The smaller e¤ect of the product tax is again because it
fails to target consumers with a high mileage.
E¤ects of discriminatory taxes by fuel type The above counterfactuals focused on
the e¤ectiveness of fuel versus product taxes, without discriminating by fuel type. We now
consider the e¤ects of discriminatory fuel taxes. This is of broad interest, since countries are
increasingly using fuel-specic tax policies to encourage the adoption of cars with alternative
fuels (such as methanol). We consider here the e¤ects of discriminatory taxes towards
gasoline and diesel fuel. Most European countries have followed such a discriminatory policy
during the past decades, with considerably lower taxes for diesel than for gasoline fuel.
A justication of this policy was the promotion of diesel cars, which have much lower CO2
emissions. More recently, there is an increasing pressure to harmonize the gasoline and diesel
fuel prices (up to the level of the gasoline fuel price), because of an increased awareness of
the negative e¤ects of diesel on local air quality, despite the lower CO2 emissions.23
Table 6 shows the e¤ects of a 50c gasoline and/or diesel fuel tax on total fuel usage for
the full random coe¢ cients logit model.24 A 50c gasoline fuel tax increase would increase
23Miravete, Moral and Thurk (2014) stress these negative environmental e¤ects of diesel fuel, and analyze
how the favorable fuel taxation towards diesel cars in Europe may have protected European rms from
foreign competition.
24The results for the simple logit appear in Appendix B. We no longer show the results for the revenue-
equivalent product taxes as this gives no major new insights (other than strenghtening the conclusion of its
lower e¤ectiveness due to the presence of mileage heterogeneity).
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the diesel market share by 19.3% points. This results in a reduction of gasoline fuel usage
by 10.7% and in an increase of diesel fuel usage by 5.3%. Conversely, a 50c diesel fuel tax
increase would reduce the diesel market share by 15.3%, which results in a reduction of diesel
fuel usage by 11.0% and an increase in gasoline fuel usage of 6.0%. These market share e¤ects
are much smaller in a logit model without mileage heterogeneity (Appendix B).
These large shifts between gasoline and diesel also have interesting e¤ects on total fuel
usage. A 50c gasoline fuel tax reduces total annual fuel usage by 3.1%. This is considerably
more than the reduction in total fuel usage when both types of fuel are taxed (1.8% as seen
above, and shown for comparison again on the bottom row of Table 6). This is because a
gasoline-only tax induces consumers to substitute to diesel cars, which have a better fuel
economy of at least 20%. For the same reason, a 50c fuel tax on only diesel fuel actually
raises total fuel usage by 1.7%: after such a tax increase, a considerable number of consumers
substitute to gasoline cars, which have a lower fuel economy.
In sum, the role of mileage heterogeneity becomes even more important under fuel-specic
tax policies. Only raising the price of gasoline fuel implies a large shift to diesel cars with
higher fuel economy, and this shift is especially by high mileage consumers. As a result,
a discriminatory policy can be especially e¤ective in reducing total fuel usage and hence
CO2 emissions. In the case of diesel fuel this can come at the expense of creating other
environmental costs from diesel cars, but for other fuels (such as methanol) discriminatory
tax policies may have unambiguously positive e¤ects.
Using the model to explain the market share of gasoline and diesel cars across
Europe The previous discussion showed how a discriminatory tax on gasoline or diesel
cars has even stronger e¤ects on total fuel usage than a uniform tax in the presence of
mileage heterogeneity. We illustrated this for Germany in 2011. We now take a di¤erent
perspective, and ask to which extent the observed discriminatory fuel taxes and di¤erences
in fuel economy can explain the market share of diesel cars across di¤erent European countries
over time. This serves as a further examination of the implications of our model, and is also
of independent interest in light of the importance of diesel cars in Europe.
Table 7 shows the results. The rst three columns show the currently observed gaps in
fuel prices and fuel economy between gasoline and diesel cars, and the diesel market shares in
the seven countries in 1998 and 2011. Diesel fuel was on average 20c per liter less expensive
than gasoline fuel in 1998. The highest diesel fuel discounts applied in Belgium, France and
the Netherlands (25c29c per liter), while there was no discount in the U.K. The gap between
the gasoline and diesel fuel price somewhat narrowed for all countries in 2011. Furthermore,
diesel cars had a better average fuel economy of about 2 liter/100km or 25% in 1998, and
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this further improved to 28% in 2011. The lower fuel price and better fuel economy coincides
with market shares for diesel cars in the range of 15%52% in 1998, and 30%75% in 2011.
The last three columns show how the diesel market share would change if the fuel price
gap and fuel economy gap were eliminated. If the price of diesel fuel would be harmonized
to the level of gasoline fuel in 1998, the market share of diesel cars would have been 714%
lower (with the exception of the UK, where there was no fuel price gap). If in addition the
fuel economy of diesel and gasoline cars would be equalized, the market share of diesel cars
would have been an additional 514% lower. In 1998, both factors together explain about
50% of the diesel market share in Belgium, the UK and Spain, and an even larger fraction
of 63% in France and Italy, 67% in Germany and 73% in the Netherlands.25 By 2011, the
importance of both factors in explaining the diesel market share has diminished because
the gap between gasoline and diesel fuel prices narrowed, while diesel cars further gained
in popularity. Nevertheless, discriminatory fuel taxes and di¤erences in fuel economy still
explain about 40% of the diesel market share across countries.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed to which extent car buyers undervalue future fuel costs, and what this
implies for the e¤ectiveness of alternative tax policies. We specically demonstrated the
importance of accounting for consumer heterogeneity in car utilization and other dimensions.
To estimate the demand model, we used detailed data at the level of the car model and
engine variant for a panel of seven European countries during 1998-2011. The institutional
features of the European car market provided a new way to identify consumer responses to
fuel costs, because for most car models consumers can choose between either a gasoline and
diesel engine. To empirically identify consumer responses to fuel costs, we thus exploit fuel
price variation by fuel type (i.e. gasoline or diesel) across countries and over time, interacted
with variation in fuel economy across products.
We nd evidence of at most only modest undervaluation of future fuel costs. To obtain
this estimate, it was important to account for both mileage heterogeneity and heterogeneity
in the valuation of other car characteristics. We then draw implications for the e¤ectiveness
of fuel taxes versus product taxes (based on a cars fuel economy). Despite the modest
undervaluation, we nd that a fuel tax is more e¤ective in reducing fuel usage than a revenue-
equivalent product tax on fuel economy, because it specically targets the high mileage
consumers to substitute to cars with a higher fuel economy. Discriminatory taxes by fuel
25Note that our model explains a considerably larger part of the diesel market share than Linn (2014),
who does not allow for heterogeneous consumer responses to fuel costs.
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type are even more e¤ective in targeting consumers with di¤erent mileage.
Because our framework makes use of aggregate demand data, it can be used to address
a variety of other environmental questions based on datasets for many countries over a long
time period. In future research, it would therefore be interesting to apply our framework
to investigate the e¤ects of specic policies that countries have followed over the past years,
and perform a more complete welfare analysis. This would include the e¤ects on consumers
and producers, accounting for several external environmental costs of fuel usage. To make
such analysis more realistic, it would also be interesting to extend our aggregate framework
to incorporate the possibility that driving behavior is not perfectly inelastic.
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8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Yearly Average Gasoline and Diesel Prices
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The gure shows average yearly prices (in real 2000 e) of gasoline and diesel between 1998 and 2011.
Source: DG ECFIN.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All years 1998 2011
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean Mean
Sales (1,000 units) 1.8 5.1 2.7 1.3
Price/Income 1.1 0.7 1.1 1.1
(Inverse) fuel economy (li/100km) 7.3 2.1 7.8 6.3
Yearly Fuel Costs/Income (100) 4.3 1.5 4.7 4.3
Horsepower (in kW) 107.4 54.6 85.1 122.0
Size (1,000 cm2) 76.7 9.9 74.0 79.5
Height (cm) 148.5 10.7 144.1 150.1
Foreign (0-1) 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.9
Diesel (0-1) 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5
Months market presence (1-12) 11.4 1.8 11.4 11.5
Number of observations 82,166 4,380 6,898
The table reports means and standard deviations of the main variables for all years and for years 1998
and 2011 separately. The total number of observations (model/engines combinations and markets)
is 82,166, where market refer to 7 countries and 14 years.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Engine Type
1998 2011
Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel
Market Share (%) 68.3 31.7 42.3 57.7
# variants per model 2.5 1.6 3.0 2.5
(Inverse) fuel economy (li/100km) 7.4 6.2 5.7 4.8
Price/Income 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.9
The table reports summary statistics by engine type (gasoline and diesel) in year 1998 and 2011.
Fuel economy and price/income are averages weighted by the number of units sold.
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates for Alternative Demand Models
Logit RC Logit I RC Logit II
Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error
Mean valuations
Price/Inc. () -4.54 0.19 -5.20 0.20 -4.37 0.22
Fuel Costs/Inc. () -39.90 1.40 -67.93 3.10 -39.37 2.67
Power (kW/100) 2.32 0.14 2.84 0.15 -1.90 0.42
Size (cm2/10,000) 13.71 0.43 15.92 0.45 18.15 0.50
Height (cm/100) 3.07 0.29 4.08 0.31 4.70 0.34
Foreign -0.84 0.02 -0.80 0.02 -0.93 0.02
Standard Deviations of valuations
Power (kW/100) - - - - 2.32 0.17
ConstantMileage - - - - 4.02 1.12
Mileage distribution No Yes Yes
Valuations of Future Fuel Costs
Fuel Costs/Price () 8.78 0.55 13.05 0.78 9.00 0.85
Future Valuation  0.85 0.05 1.27 0.08 0.87 0.08
 Consumer Surplus (e) -49.67 -111.88 -22.43
The table reports the parameter estimates and standard errors for the di¤erent demand models. The logit
assumes homogeneous mileage (mi = 
m
) and homogeneous valuations for characteristics in xjkt (
x
i =

x
). The random coe¢ cients logit I assumes heterogeneous mileage (mi ) and homogeneous valuations
for all the other characteristics in xjkt (
x
i = 
x
). The random coe¢ cients logit II assumes heterogeneous
mileage (mi ) and heterogeneous valuations for characteristics in xjkt (
x
i ). Each specication includes
model, market/diesel and market/time controls. The total number of observations (combinations of
model/engine/market) is 82,166, where markets refer to 7 countries and 14 years. The lower panel
reports: (i) the Ratio Fuel Costs/Price (); which converts annual costs into their present discounted
value; (ii) the attention weight or future valuation parameter (); calculated assuming a market interest
rate r = 6% and an expected car longevity S = 15; (iii) the consumer surplus losses per vehicle in e.
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Table 4: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax and a Product Tax on Market Shares by Fuel Economy
Quartile
 = 0:50  = 0:87  = 1:00
Change in Market Share Current % Point % % Point % % Point %
Fuel Tax
Tax per liter e0.50 e0.50 e0.50
Fuel Economy Q1 (highest) 37 2.3 7.3 4.4 12.0 5.2 13.3
Fuel Economy Q2 37 -0.4 -1.0 -1.5 -4.1 -2.0 -5.6
Fuel Economy Q3 20 -1.1 -4.8 -1.9 -9.5 -2.1 -11.1
Fuel Economy Q4 (lowest) 6 -0.8 -10.1 -1.0 -16.1 -1.0 -17.7
Revenue Equivalent Product Tax
Tax per liter/100km e839.98 e767.37 e739.34
Fuel Economy Q1 (highest) 37 3.6 11.8 3.8 10.4 3.8 9.8
Fuel Economy Q2 37 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -1.9 -0.8 -2.3
Fuel Economy Q3 20 -1.8 -8.1 -1.8 -9.1 -1.8 -9.4
Fuel Economy Q4 (lowest) 6 -1.6 -20.7 -1.3 -20.9 -1.2 -20.8
The table reports the % point and % changes of a fuel tax and a revenue-equivalent product tax on the
market shares of new cars aggregated by quartile of fuel economy. Market shares e¤ects are estimated
under strong consumer myopia ( = 0:50), under the actual estimate of consumer valuation of fuel costs
( = 0:87) and under full forward looking behavior ( = 1:00), on the basis of the parameter estimates of
RCLogit II in Table 3. The gures refer to Germany in 2011. Q1=quartile 1; Q2=quartile 2; Q3=quartile
3; Q4=quartile 4.
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Table 5: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax and a Product Tax on Fuel Economy and Fuel Usage
Conditional on Buying Unconditional on Buying
Fuel Economy Fuel Usage Fuel Usage Outside Good
% Change % Change % Change % Change
Logit model
Fuel Tax -2.0 -2.0 -32.8 10.1
Revenue Eq. Product Tax -2.7 -2.7 -42.7 13.2
RC Logit II
Fuel Tax -1.3 -1.8 -14.2 4.7
Revenue Eq. Product Tax -1.6 -1.6 -12.6 5.0
The table reports the e¤ect of a fuel tax and a revenue-equivalent product tax on average fuel economy
and total annual fuel usage, conditional and unconditional on consumers continuing to buy a car. The
simulations are based on the parameter estimates in Table 3. The gures refer to Germany in 2011.
Table 6: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax on Gasoline and Diesel Separately
Fuel Usage Diesel Share
All cars Gasoline cars Diesel cars
% Change % Change % Change % Point Change
Fuel Tax, Gasoline only -3.1 -10.7 5.6 19.3
Fuel Tax, Diesel only 1.7 6.2 -11.0 -15.3
Fuel Tax, both Gas. and Diesel -1.8 -2.6 -0.3 4.3
The table reports the e¤ect of a discriminatory fuel tax for gasoline and diesel cars on total fuel usage,
conditional on consumers continuing to buy a car. The simulations are based on the parameter estimates
of RC Logit II in Table 3. The gures refer to Germany in 2011.
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Table 7: Explaining the Diesel Market Shares Across Countries
Current Situation Change in Diesel Share: Equalization of
Fuel price gap Fuel Economy Gap Diesel Share Fuel Price Fuel Economy Both
Year 1998
Belgium -0.25 -1.91 52% -12% -12% -24%
France -0.26 -2.04 38% -14% -10% -24%
Germany -0.22 -2.35 15% -5% -5% -10%
Great Britain 0.00 -2.24 15% 0% -7% -7%
Italy -0.19 -2.08 21% -7% -6% -13%
Netherlands -0.29 -2.12 21% -9% -6% -15%
Spain -0.11 -1.85 51% -9% -14% -24%
Year 2011
Belgium -0.24 -2.01 75% -4% -14% -18%
France -0.19 -1.81 69% -5% -18% -23%
Germany -0.16 -2.23 46% -5% -17% -22%
Great Britain 0.04 -2.04 50% 2% -17% -16%
Italy -0.13 -2.05 56% -5% -19% -24%
Netherlands -0.28 -2.22 30% -6% -12% -18%
Spain -0.07 -2.08 69% -3% -25% -28%
The table reports: (i) in the rst three columns, the currently observed gaps in fuel prices and fuel
economy between gasoline and diesel cars, and the diesel market shares in the seven countries of our
dataset in 1998 (upper panel) and 2011 (lower panel); in the last three columns, how the diesel market
share would change if the fuel price gap and fuel economy gap were eliminated. The simulations are
based on the parameter estimates of RC Logit II in Table 3.
33
References
Adamou, Adamos, Sofronis Clerides, and Theodoros Zachariadis, Welfare Impli-
cations of Car Feebates: A Simulation Analysis,The Economic Journal, 2014, 124 (578),
F420F443.
Allcott, Hunt and Michael Greenstone, Is There an Energy E¢ ciency Gap?,The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2012, pp. 328.
and NathanWozny, Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox,Review
of Economics and Statistics, 2012, forthcoming.
, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Dmitry Taubinsky, Energy Policy with Externalities
and Internalities,Journal of Public Economics, April 2014, 112.
Alquist, Ron, Lutz Kilian, and Robert J. Vigfusson, Forecasting the Price of Oil,
CEPR Discussion Papers 8388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers May 2011.
Anderson, Soren T., Ian W. H. Parry, James M. Sallee, and Carolyn Fischer,
Automobile Fuel Economy Standards: Impacts, E¢ ciency, and Alternatives,Review of
Environmental Economics and Policy, Winter 2011, 5 (1), 89108.
, Ryan Kellogg, and James M. Sallee, What Do Consumers Believe About Future
Gasoline Prices?,Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2013, 66 (3),
383403.
Baltagi, Badi H., Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Wiley & Sons, 1995.
34
Bento, Antonio M., Lawrence H. Goulder, Mark R. Jacobsen, and Roger H.
von Haefen, Distributional and E¢ ciency Impacts of Increased US Gasoline Taxes,
American Economic Review, June 2009, 99 (3), 66799.
, Shanjun Li, and Kevin Roth, Is there an energy paradox in fuel economy? A note
on the role of consumer heterogeneity and sorting bias,Economics Letters, 2012, 115 (1),
44 48.
Berry, Steven T., Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Di¤erentiation,The
RAND Journal of Economics, 1994, 25 (2), 242262.
, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes, Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium,
Econometrica, 1995, 63 (4), 841890.
, , and , Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy,
American Economic Review, June 1999, 89 (3), 400430.
Busse, Meghan R., Christopher R. Knittel, and Florian Zettelmeyer, Are Con-
sumers Myopic? Evidence from New and Used Car Purchases,American Economic Re-
view, February 2013, 103 (1), 22056.
Chamberlain, Gary, Asymptotic e¢ ciency in estimation with conditional moment re-
strictions,Journal of Econometrics, 1987, 34 (3), 305 334.
DHaultfoeuille, Xavier, Pauline Givord, and Xavier Boutin, The Environmental
E¤ect of Green Taxation: The Case of the French Bonus/Malus,The Economic Journal,
2014, 124 (578), F444F480.
Gillingham, Kenneth, Selection on Anticipated Driving and the Consumer Response to
Changing Gasoline Prices,Technical Report, Yale University 2012.
35
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, The E¤ects of the Corporate Average Fuel E¢ ciency
Standards in the US,Journal of Industrial Economics, March 1998, 46 (1), 133.
and Rebecca Hellerstein, A Structural Approach to Identifying the Sources of Local
Currency Price Stability,Review of Economic Studies, 2013, 80 (1), 175210.
Greene, David L., How Consumers Value Fuel Economy: A Literature Review,Technical
Report EPA-420-R-10-008, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency March 2010.
Hausman, Jerry A., Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of
Energy-Using Durables,Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, 10 (1), 3354.
Helfand, Gloria and Ann Wolverton, Evaluating the consumer response to fuel econ-
omy : a review of the literature, International review of environmental and resource
economics, 2011, 5, 103146.
Hughes, Jonathan E., Christopher R. Knittel, and Daniel Sperling, Evidence of a
Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand,The Energy Journal, 2008,
29 (1), 113134.
Huse, Cristian and Claudio Lucinda, The market impact and the cost of environmental
policy: evidence from the Swedish green car rebate,The Economic Journal, 2014, 124
(578), F393F419.
Ja¤e, Adam B. and Robert N. Stavins, The energy paradox and the di¤usion of
conservation technology,Resource and Energy Economics, May 1994, 16 (2), 91122.
Klier, Thomas and Joshua Linn, The Price of Gasoline and New Vehicle Fuel Econ-
omy: Evidence fromMonthly Sales Data,American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
August 2010, 2 (3), 13453.
36
and , Using Taxes to Reduce Carbon Dioxide Emissions Rates of New Passenger
Vehicles: Evidence from France, Germany, and Sweden,American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 2015, 7(1), 132.
Langer, Ashley and Nathan Miller, AutomakersShort-Run Responses to Changing
Gasoline Prices,Review of Economics and Statistics, 2013, 95 (4), 11981211.
Li, Shanjun, Christopher Timmins, and Roger H. von Haefen, How Do Gaso-
line Prices A¤ect Fleet Fuel Economy?,American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
August 2009, 1 (2), 11337.
Linn, Joshua, Explaining the Adoption of Diesel Fuel Passenger Cars in Europe,Discus-
sion Paper 14-08, Resources for the Future April 2014.
Miravete, Eugenio, Maria J. Moral, and Je¤ Thurk, Protecting the European Au-
tomobile Industry through Environmental Regulation: The Adoption of Diesel Engines,
April 2014.
Parry, Ian W. H., Margaret Walls, and Winston Harrington, Automobile Exter-
nalities and Policies,Journal of Economic Literature, 2007, 45 (2), 373399.
Petrin, Amil, Quantifying the Benets of New Products: The Case of the Minivan,
Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 110, 70529.
Reynaert, Mathias and Frank Verboven, Improving the performance of random coef-
cients demand models: The role of optimal instruments,Journal of Econometrics, 2014,
179 (1), 83 98.
Sallee, James, Rational Inattention and Energy E¢ ciency, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 2014, forthcoming.
37
Verboven, Frank, Quality-Based Price Discrimination and Tax Incidence: Evidence from
Gasoline and Diesel Cars,RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2002, 33 (2), 275297.
38
APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Appendix A. E¤ects of a fuel tax and a product tax
In this Appendix, we rst derive the analytic expressions for the demand e¤ects of a fuel
tax and a product tax based on fuel economy. We then describe the specic approach to
implement the policy counterfactuals.
A.1 Impact of small tax changes on demand
Assume for simplicity that the fuel tax and product tax is uniform, i.e. there is no distinction
between gasoline and diesel engine k. The individual choice probability for product jk of a
consumer i can be written as:
sijk

tG; tE ; i

=
exp(vijk)
1 +
PJ
j0
PKj0
k0=1 exp(vij0k0)
:
and total sales of product product jk under taxes (tG; tE) are:
qjk

tG; tE

=
Z

sijk

tG; tE ; 

dF()I;
where the individual utility minus extreme value random variable is dened as
vijk  xjkxi   i(pjk + tEejk + mi ejk

gk + t
G

) + jk:
The own- and cross-e¤ects of a change in individual utility on the individual choice
probabilities take the usual form:
@sijk
@vijk
= sijk
 
1  sijk

@sijk
@vij0k0
=  sij0k0sijk:
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The e¤ect of a uniform fuel tax tG on the individual choice probability is then:
@sijk
@tG
=  imi
X
j0
X
k0
@sijk
@vj0k0
ej0k0
=  imi sijk
0@ejk  X
j0
X
k0
sij0k0ej0k0
1A
=  imi sijk
0@ejk   (1  si0)X
j0
X
k0
ej0k0
sij0k0
1  si0
1A
=  imi sijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

where
ei =
X
j0
X
k0
ej0k0
sij0k0
1  si0
is the expected fuel economy of consumer i.
The e¤ect of the fuel tax on total demand is then given by:
@qjk
@tG
=
Z

@sijk
@tG
dF()I
=  
Z

i
m
i sijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I:
We can follow similar steps to compute the e¤ect of product tax tE , so that the e¤ects of
both taxes are summarized as:
@qjk
@tG
=  
Z

i
m
i sijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I
@qjk
@tE
=  
Z

isijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I;
which are the expressions presented in the main text. This shows several things. First, the
e¤ect of tax is similar to a price elasticity of industry demand, except for the term ejk   ei.
If ejk   ei = 0, the e¤ect is just like elasticity of industry demand. If ejk > ei, then the
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e¤ect is bigger (worst fuel e¢ cient cars loose most). If ejk   ei < 0, the e¤ect is smaller and
may easily turn positive. Second, the energy tax is di¤erent from product tax because of
 and mi . This can be conrmed from revenue equivalent tax below. Note also that the
expressions simplify if the outside good is absent (inelastic market demand). Then the sign
of the tax e¤ect simply depends on sign of ejk   ei.
A.2 Details on the policy counterfactuals
We derive the expressions used in our policy counterfactuals to compute the e¤ects of the
fuel tax tGk and the product tax t
E
k on revenues, market shares, total fuel usage and average
fuel economy. Let k = 1 refer to gasoline, and k = 2 refer to diesel. Denote the vector of
taxes by (tG; tE), where tG = (tG1 ; t
G
2 ) is the energy tax vector, and t
E = (tE1 ; t
E
2 ) is the
product tax vector.
Sales We slightly modify some of the expressions in the previous subsection to account for
the fact that the fuel tax and product tax can vary per fuel type. The choice probability
for product jk of a consumer i with a random coe¢ cient vector i = (
x
i ; i; 
m
i ) facing tax
vector tG and tE is:
sijk

tG; tE ; i

=
exp(vijk)
1 +
PJ
j0
PKj0
k0=1 exp(vij0k0)
;
where the individual utility minus extreme value random variable is now dened with non-
uniform taxes as
vijk  xjkxi   i(pjk + tEk ejk + mi ejk

gk + t
G
k

) + jk:
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Total sales of product product jk under taxes (tG; tE) are again:
qjk

tG; tE

=
Z

sijk

tG; tE ; 

dF()I
So the current quantity is qjk (0; 0), the predicted quantity after only a fuel tax is qjk
 
0; tG

and the predicted quantity after only a product tax is qjk
 
tE ; 0

. Based on these predicted
quantities per product jk we can compute the market shares per fuel economy quartile (or
any other aggregated quantity or market share).
Tax revenues Conditional on buying product jk, an individual consumer pays a taxes 
tEk + 
m
i t
G
k

ejk, i.e. the sum of the product tax plus capitalized future energy taxes.
Total tax revenues over all products jk are dened as:
R

tG; tE

=
Z

X
j
X
k

tEk + 
m
i t
G
k

ejksijk

tGk ; t
E
k ; 

dF()I;
i.e. the expected tax revenue over all cars per consumer, averaged over all consumers. We
can then compute the tax revenues from only an energy tax R
 
tG; 0

or only a product tax
R
 
0; tE

as:
R

tG; 0

=
Z

X
j
X
k
mi t
G
k ejksijk

tGk ; 0; 

dF()I
R

0; tE

=
Z

X
j
X
k
tEk ejksijk

0; tEk ; 

dF()I:
With uniform taxes, we consider a 50c energy tax, R (0:5; 0), so that the revenue-neutral
product tax is the solution of tG to R
 
0; tG

= R (0:5; 0).
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Average fuel economy and total energy usage Conditional average fuel economy,
given that people purchase a car is
E

tG; tE

=
X
j
X
k
ejk
sjk
 
tGk ; t
E
k ; 
m
i

1  s00
 
tGk ; t
E
k ; 
m
i
 ;
where
sjk

tG; tE

=
Z

sijk

tG; tE ; 

dF()
Conditional total annual fuel usage given that people buy a car is
FC

tG; tE

=
Z

X
j
X
k
mi ejksijkjB

tGk ; t
E
k ; 

dF()I;
and unconditional total annual energy usage is given by
FU

tG; tE

=
Z

X
j
X
k
mi ejksijk

tGk ; t
E
k ; 

dF()I:
This accounts for the fact that consumers may substitute to the outside good after a tax
increase, so that they do not consume any fuel.
Based on this, we can compute the percentage change in average fuel economy and the
percentage change in fuel usage for both taxes. For example, the percentage change in fuel
economy for a fuel tax is %E = E
 
tG; 0

=E (0; 0)  1.
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B Appendix B. Additional Tables
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Table B.1: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax and a Product Tax on Market Shares by Fuel Economy
Quartile - Logit
 = 0:50  = 0:87  = 1:00
Change in Market Share: Current % Point % % Point % % Point %
Fuel Tax
Fuel Tax per liter e0.50 e0.50 e0.50
Fuel Economy Q1 (highest) 37 2.0 6.3 3.4 9.3 3.9 10.2
Fuel Economy Q2 37 0.3 0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -1.1
Fuel Economy Q3 20 -1.0 -4.5 -1.8 -8.9 -2.1 -11.0
Fuel Economy Q4 (lowest) 6 -1.3 -15.1 -1.5 -24.2 -1.5 -27.7
Revenue Equivalent Product Tax
Tax per liter/100km e 1,352.00 e 890.03 e 759.79
Fuel Economy Q1 (highest) 37 7.1 22.1 4.6 12.7 3.9 10.2
Fuel Economy Q2 37 0.4 1.0 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -1.1
Fuel Economy Q3 20 -3.6 -16.4 -2.4 -12.2 -2.1 -11.0
Fuel Economy Q4 (lowest) 6 -3.8 -44.0 -1.9 -31.6 -1.5 -27.7
The table reports the e¤ect of a fuel tax and a revenue-equivalent product tax on the market shares
of new cars aggregated by quartile of fuel economy. Market shares e¤ects are estimated under strong
consumer myopia ( = 0:50), under the actual estimate of consumer valuation of fuel costs ( = 0:87)
and under full forward looking behavior ( = 1:00), on the basis of the parameter estimates of Logit in
Table 3: The gures refer to Germany in 2011. All values are in percent. Q1=quartile 1; Q2=quartile 2;
Q3=quartile 3; Q4=quartile 4.
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Table B.2: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax and a Product Tax on Fuel Economy and Fuel Usage
Under Di¤erent Valuation Parameters
Conditional on Buying Unconditional on Buying
Fuel Economy Fuel Usage Fuel Usage Outside Good
% Change % Change % Change % Change
Logit model with  = 0:5
Fuel Tax -1.5 -1.5 -17.6 10.0
Revenue Eq. Product Tax -4.6 -4.6 -53.7 24.0
RC Logit II with  = 0:5
Fuel Tax -0.8 -1.2 -7.2 2.8
Revenue Eq. Product Tax -1.9 -1.9 -12.6 5.8
Logit model with  = 1
Fuel Tax -2.2 -2.2 -38.8 10.0
Revenue Eq. Product Tax -2.2 -2.2 -38.8 10.0
RC Logit II with  = 1
Fuel Tax -1.5 -1.9 -16.8 5.3
Revenue Eq. Product Tax -1.5 -1.5 -12.4 4.6
The table reports the e¤ect of a fuel tax and a revenue-equivalent product tax on average fuel economy
and total annual fuel usage, conditional and unconditional on consumers continuing to buy a car for two
values of consumer valuation of fuel costs ():  = 0:5 and  = 1. The simulations are based on the
parameter estimates in Table 3. The gures refer to Germany in 2011.
Table B.3: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax on Gasoline and Diesel Separately
Total fuel usage Diesel share
All cars Gasoline cars Diesel cars
% change % change % change % point change
Fuel Tax, Gasoline only -2.7 -1.9 0.0 13.6
Fuel Tax, Diesel only 1.1 0.0 -1.6 -11.4
Fuel Tax -2.0 -1.9 -1.6 1.8
The table reports the e¤ect of a discriminatory fuel tax for gasoline and diesel cars on total fuel usage,
conditional on consumers continuing to buy a car. The simulations are based on the parameter estimates
of Logit in Table 3. The gures refer to Germany in 2011.
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